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Social Capital: From the Gringo’s Tale to the Colombian Reality  
 
Ben Fine and Juan Pablo Durán Ortiz * 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The current idea of “social capital” as driver of development and social change is not so much 
an illusion as a delusion. A justification for this emerges once power, class, conflict and 
context are explicitly brought to bear upon the social capital paradigm. This paper studies 
social capital in Colombia beginning with its initial definition proposed by Pierre Bourdieu in 
the early 1980s, with emphasis upon a contextualised reproduction and exercise of elite power. 
In this light, the real as opposed to the delusionary social capital can explain a great deal of the 
social and economic evolution of the country. For Colombia has been captured by the “social 
capital” of national elites, drug dealers and multinational firms, ably abetted by the US 
government. It has launched a campaign of systematic violence against its citizenry under the 
paper-thin ideology of development and the war against drugs and terrorism in order to accrue 
profits from evictions and land expropriation. 
 
Keywords: development, evictions, land expropriation, social capital, war against drugs and 
terrorism 
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3 
Introduction  
 
Although Colombia is well-known for its drug dealing and violence, substantial hopes (and 
funding) have been placed upon new models of development in which corresponding forms of 
social organisation and economic activity can lead to more positive outcomes.1 
Unsurprisingly, social capital has been seen as a major lever through which such a 
transformation can be brought about. The thrust of this article is that such prospects are not so 
much an illusion as a delusion. We begin by locating the social capital paradigm in its 
application to Latin America where it has prospered only by remaining blind to economic and 
social realities or by undermining itself once allowing for those realities. This is followed by 
an account of how “social capital” in Colombia has been irreducibly attached to the exercise of 
power in promoting a particular model of development that has positively drawn upon 
violence, land dispossession, drug dealing and drug dealers, and the economic interests of 
existing and emerging elites. The concluding remarks highlight the extent to which the 
mythologies of social capital perpetrate an intellectual violence that mirror images that to be 
found, literally, on the ground.  
From Social Capital to … 
The social capital paradigm continues to burn bright even though it was abandoned in the early 
2000s by the World Bank just as precipitously as it had been so extraordinary adopted and 
promulgated in the mid-1990s.2 Visit the World Bank website for social capital (as was done 
                                                            
1 International aid has involved various forms of “social capital” for Colombia in the form of associations 
and cooperatives across a wide variety of economic sectors, from financial cooperatives focused on 
microcredit driven by the Alliance for Progress under John F. Kennedy’s administration to cooperatives 
of rural peasants through the Plan Colombia under Clinton’s Presidency. This aid has been a strategic 
part of the US military doctrine of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). 
2 For an account from World Bank social capitalists that the notion was dropped because it had served 
its purpose of civilising economists to the social, see Bebbington (2004) and Bebbington et al (2004 
and 2006). For critique, not least that World Bank economists appropriated the social whilst leaving 
their economics barbaric, see Fine (2008, 2010a and 2011), and Fine (1999 and 2001) for an earlier 
critical review of social capital in general and its role in a neo-liberal post Washington Consensus in 
particular. 
SOAS Department of Economics Working Paper Series No 195 - 2016 
 
 
4 
in mid-2013),3 and we find claimed that, “A vibrant community of practice addresses social 
capital. The Social Capital Thematic Group (TG) brings together roughly 250 World Bank 
professionals from various sectors, networks and families interested in how to apply social 
capital to World Bank operations.” Further: 
Within the Social Development Department (SDV), the CDD and Social Capital Team 
coordinates efforts to apply the idea of social capital to operations. The Team 
combines operational and research experience on Community Driven Development 
and Social Capital. 
Yet even casual inspection of the website reveals a signal lack of activity. Both the Local 
Level Institutions and the Social Capital Initiative Working Paper Series do not extend 
beyond 2001. The Social Capital Document Library and Papers in Progress are simply not 
available. Both Website Citations and the Discussion Forum Archive do not extend beyond 
2000. The last two news items, “Nepal and the World Bank: Four Decades of Development 
Partnerships” and “Housing Finance Needs to Reach South Asia’s Poor”, are somewhat 
more recent at February 2nd, 2011, and December 1st, 2010, respectively, but do not, 
however, on casual inspection seem to make any reference to social capital at all.4 And, last 
but by no means least, we are offered four experiences from the field, country studies with 
dates given in parenthesis; Albania (2005), Philippines (2003), Thailand (1998) and Sierra 
Leone (2005). 
                                                            
3 See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTTSOC
IALCAPITAL/0,,menuPK:401021~pagePK:149018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:401015,00.html 
4 This is commonplace in the use of social capital in light of its status as a buzzword and fuzzword, 
Fine (2010b). 
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In short, making allowance for lags to allow for “closure”, social capital has been dead at the 
World Bank for a decade or more. In Latin America, the influence of the World Bank’s 
abrupt departure from the social capital scene was dutifully followed although it was initially 
left high and dry with the post-apocalyptic publication of the results of CEPAL/ECLAC’s 
(2004) main social capital initiative, following on from a major conference a few years 
earlier, featuring Francis Fukuyama (2004) and all.5 Significantly, the Part of the book on 
gender includes two contributions, neither of which, strikingly and possibly pointedly, 
mentions social capital at all, Montaño (2004) and Garcia (2004). Another paper, Dirven 
(2004), covers social capital and rural development, with proposals for action across a 
number of different levels – building social capital; generational transfers; trade associations; 
vertical organisation; and production clusters. But, with thirty or so subheadings, the 
contribution fails to mention trade unions and at most offers a passing reference to the role of 
the central state, admittedly standard fare for the social capital literature as well as its 
blindnesses for the “social capital” of the rich, powerful and better organised. Subsequently, 
there have been effectively only two references on the CEPAL/ECLAC website for social 
capital since the publication of its book.  
But its effects still live on, not least in Latin America. Consider, for example, the ambition of 
the following conference announcement, itself a symbol of the concept’s gargantuan 
appetite:6 
The Inter-American Conference on Social Security (CISS) and the Universidad 
Iberoamericana (Ibero) jointly organizing the conference "Empirical analysis of 
                                                            
5 With a video message of support from former US President Carter, 
http://www.cepal.org/prensa/noticias/comunicados/3/7903/mcpherson.htm. 
6 http://www.socialcapitalgateway.org/it/content/call/empirical-analysis-social-capital-and-
development-latin-america Note the socialcapitalgateway offers an outstanding coverage of social 
capital, not least indicating its ambitions. 
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Social Capital and Development in Latin America". The Conference will take place 
in Mexico City on May 17, 2013. Its aim is to present and socialise empirical 
research on social capital and its relationship to social development in Latin America 
using different surveys available in the region that address social capital dimensions. 
Particular emphasis will be on documents related to Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
It is expected that articles registered for the conference will present evidence of 
research on topics that relates social capital with social development. Some of them 
are listed here. 
Social Capital and: 
1. Social security mechanisms. 
2. Reduction of crime and/or violence. 
3. Social fabric. 
4. Quality in education. 
5. Employment. 
6. Mechanisms for allocating public resources 
7. Poverty reduction 
8. Inequalities (income, gender, ethnicity, region, etc.) 
9. Social cohesion. 
10. Food resources supplies. 
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7 
11. Wellbeing. 
12. Health. 
13. NGOs. 
14. Social mobility. 
15. Financial inclusion. 
16. Political participation 
17. Measurement issues 
18. Other Related Topic 
There are interesting origins for this putative scope for the application of social capital. When 
the World Bank initially and strategically engaged with social capital, whilst prompted by its 
non-economists to do so, the process was very rapidly tied to mainstream neoliberal 
economists at Michigan State University, with a contract being issued to compile a 
bibliography for the concept.7 Thus, as confessed in the CEPAL/ECLAC volume, Figueras 
(2004, p. 230):8 
                                                            
7 Is it (social capital) coincidence that the author of the infamous Berg Report, that ushered the 
Washington Consensus into Africa, also derived from MSU? Note that social capital has now given 
way to “nudge”, see latest World Development Report for 2015, for which similar sorts of connections 
prevail, not least across Blair and Cameron advisors, and DfID and other funding. See Fine et al (2015) 
for a critique. 
8 Referencing Feldman and Assaf (1999). Note this invention, especially in the World Bank literature 
review, despite the absences of social capital in past literature, had already been observed by Fine 
(2001), and see debate between Farr (2004 and 2007) and Fine (2007) more generally for the concept’s 
historical (re)invention. 
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A study of major efforts made to generate basic bibliographies on social capital reveals 
a predominance of works that never actually used the concept, many of them prior to 
the current boom in the term. 
In other words, social capital was being invented. This is so much so that one of its leading 
proponents from MSU, and co-organiser of the CEPAL conference, ended up with a 
stunningly vacuous definition of social capital:9 
Social capital is a person or group’s sympathy or sense of obligation for another person 
or group. The objects of sympathetic feelings have social capital. Those holding 
sympathetic feelings for others provide social capital. Because social capital providers 
internalise the consequences of their choices, they trade with each other on different 
terms and at different levels that would occur in arm’s length transactions, all other 
things equal. But changes in the terms and level of trade alter the distribution of 
income. Therefore, changes in the distribution of social capital alter the distribution of 
income. 
We know of no other approach that places so much weight upon “sympathy” in explaining 
economic outcomes. Given that, over the period of neoliberalism, the share of the top 1% of 
earners in the USA has gone from well under 10% to well over 20%, we must imagine that the 
country has become bereft of sympathy although the rise of (the “social capital” of) finance 
might have something more to do with this outcome! Meanwhile, MSU has plundered its 
sympathetic capture of social capital through its Latin American Centre, providing essay 
topics and study programmes in the region for its students on the topic of social capital.10 
                                                            
9 The abstract for a seminar but see Robison et al (2011) for example.  
10 http://latinamerica.isp.msu.edu/CLACS%20Strategic%20plan%20final.pdf 
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Nonetheless, social capital has always had a momentum of its own, not entirely under the spell 
of the World Bank and CEPAL/ECLAC. Given the space vacated by the latter, there has been 
more opportunity for more radical as well as idiosyncratic contributions to emerge, with some 
impetus provided by the specificities of the continent and the assessment of the impact of large 
aid programmes that had been more or less loosely attached to social capital. Thus, Wood et al 
(2007) finds that conversion from Catholicism to Pentecostal Protestantism will reduce infant 
mortality by 10%.11 Otherwise, much of the idiosyncratic literature, none the worse for being 
so, both accepts and undermines its own use of social capital by emphasising how it is 
irreducibly contextual and situated. The one exception is in the use of social capital as 
representing greater or lower levels of trust, specifically in the context-less context of 
behavioural experiments in which Latin American citizens are judged against counterparts 
from other countries for their degree of altruism, as revealed in the laboratory of behavioural 
economics. 
Yet the main thrust for social capital across the developing world has been for poverty 
alleviation and growth, but each geographical region has tended to attract its own speciality, 
entrepreneurship for Africa for example, in which the continent’s poor performance was 
explained by World Bank economists by absence of social capital.12 For Latin America, 
though, the particular angles for exploitation of social capital have been gender, violence and 
indigenous people (if also migration, especially international). The result has been an equally 
more than usual acknowledgement of negative social capital with a critical recognition, in 
addition, that the indigenous are seen both as a major obstacle to modernisation through 
anachronistic culture and isolation, and yet as a potential source of cooperation to promote 
                                                            
11 Recall that Coleman’s (1988) founding (rational choice) study of social capital was based on the 
finding that those attached to (Catholic) schooling achieved better educational outcomes, a conclusion 
that overlooked the different resources involved, correction for which eliminated the result. See Fine 
(2001 and 2010a) for a critique of Coleman’s contribution to social capital. 
12 See Collier and Gunning (1999) and Fine (2011) for a critique. 
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private entrepreneurship, Andolina et al (2009).13 Violence is perceived as a close associate of 
gender oppression and of the negative social capital underpinning the drug economy.14 
Consequently, unusually heavy resources have been dedicated to promoting alternative forms 
of social capital to underpin shifts in economic activity. 
One unavoidable theme across the literature is how the impact of social capital is heavily 
conditioned by presence or not of other factors (and to the credit of much the Latin American 
literature, the pervasive presence of neoliberalism is seen as a major conditioning factor). 
Thus, for Anderson (2010), the different experiences of democracy in Nicaragua and 
Argentina can only be explained by social capital if this is seen in conjunction with the 
addition of differences in institutional and political “capital” between the two countries. This 
is just another way of saying that, for social capital, context matters, as emphasised by Bossert 
(1998) in a study of decentralised health provision in Colombia, concluding so weakly that it 
leaves social capital with little if any purchase at all (especially if the negative effects of social 
capital were also acknowledged!), p. 1517: 
The social capital approach suggests that some characteristics of the local community 
may facilitate the capacity of local governments to perform better and to achieve 
objectives such as those of health reform. It is a relatively conservative vision, 
however, that does not have clear policy implications. 
It is, in addition, a moot point whether contextualising social capital has the contradictory 
effect of undermining it. For, how can a universal category, such as social capital, retain that 
property if both its definition and its impact depend upon specific conditions. In other words, 
                                                            
13 Was it always thus, not least because the analytical structure for the positive effects of social capital 
is identical to that for the negative effects of corruption and rent seeking. You pays your money, and 
you makes your choice, generally according to your preference towards the market if within limits as 
the social capital paradigm tends to prefer civil society over the state.  
14 See Moser (2009) for example. 
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social capital in one context, walking a dog in a park in a developed country and gaining 
acquaintances, has little or no commonality with drug cartels in any other part of the world. 
Yet, they are both putatively social capital of a common genus.15  
One general, if not universal, characteristic of the social capital literature, that has enabled this 
fudge, is the general marginalisation of its perverse, dark or negative side, an unavoidable of 
social capital (not least in the organisation of power and oppression). This is not just, as 
usually accepted when acknowledged, that social capital can do bad things. But it is also the 
exclusion of those traditional variables of social science attached to class, power and conflict 
as well as their organisational forms, ranging from trade unions through corporations to the 
state itself. It is also to allow for context to be incorporated in at most the shallowest of ways; 
as it were, social capital can help with this problem in this context as long as no attention is 
devoted to remedying that context. 
Such tensions are revealed, for example, by Mahar’s (2010) study of social capital in Oaxaca, 
for which thriving social activity was present in the 1980s when no one talked of social capital 
whilst collectively struggling for amenities and jobs. Subsequently, social capital declined as 
these were provided but in a context of, “self-employment for little economic gain, no health 
care, no security, and little real citizenship or entitlement”, p. 54. The leitmotif here is the rise 
of neoliberalism, the unavoidable general context of any serious study of social capital.  
                                                            
15 It is unfortunate that Portes (2010, p. 47) should conclude, whilst observing reality is complex, 
riddled with contradictions, subject to good and bad social capital, and not necessarily positive sum, 
that:  
Economic sociology has in social capital one of its most valuable explanatory tools …As a 
midrange ideal type, social capital is not only operationalizable but also transportable, 
rendering service as an explanatory tool in a number of different settings and for a wide variety 
of phenomena. 
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Thus, in an outstanding article on squatter settlements in Lima, Brodrecht (2012) offers a 
compelling account of how neoliberal policies have not only denied inhabitants access to both 
individual and social resources, ranging from education to housing, but this in turn has 
deprived them of the capacity to form and utilise “social capital” to press for alternatives, let 
alone engendering competitive individualism in pursuit of whatever resources are available. 
Surely, though, this is indicative, not of the need to build “social capital” but to address the 
structural problems of systemic deprivation. Indeed, this has been recognised by Richards 
(2000, p. 198), not least in how social capital can crowd out alternatives, for, “While some 
actors in civil society, such as soup kitchens and service-oriented NGOs have become more 
active, other actors, such as labour movements, are marginalised”. Consequently, p. 199: 
Since the poor are often excluded or marginalised as a result of policies in Latin 
America today, their access to effective social capital is likely to be restricted … 
Current policies also result in exclusion, perhaps precluding the development of the 
common identity necessary for social movements to be effective. In a sense, then, 
focusing on civil society and social capital alone may represent an implicit threat to 
social rights. 
As Ramírez (2009, p. 184) puts it after reviewing a $400 million dollar fund to displace coca 
cultivation, with 141 projects and presence of three NGOs: 
Power relations, property rights, and inequality regarding access to resources by these 
local enterprise associations are washed out of the concept of social capital, as is the 
importance of political movements, parties and labour unions as interlocutors with the 
state or any development agency. 
She continues to question whether: 
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If social capital exists, can it be developed and promoted? Or is this process of 
promoting social capital disguising or disregarding, intentionally or otherwise, 
structural issues of inequality as well as local associations and institutions that are 
working together to resolve structural problems in the region. 
And, more cynically, concludes, p. 185: 
After four years of alternative development projects and NGO activity in the region, 
campesinos have catalogued the language, skills, and methods of NGOs and seek to 
use a similar language to assert their capacity to engage in alternative development 
without NGO guidance, [so that] … subjects of neoliberalism find in it a number of 
resources and tools … Can this be considered an example of productive social capital? 
There is a sense, then, in which in a Latin American context, social capital has for some and in 
certain respects turned full circle. The initial promotion of social capital derived in the early 
1980s from the radical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, with emphasis upon a contextualised 
reproduction and exercise of elite power. The World Bank’s affair with the concept seduced 
and continues to seduce the concept’s adherents that are blind to the systemic forces of 
oppression, disadvantage and power, with benign disregard of its dark side in general and 
violence in particular. As observed, it is to the credit of much of the Latin American literature, 
and its close empirical scholarship, that it sees through such obfuscating smokescreens to the 
social conditioning of social capital and what social conditions it can realistically and 
significantly expect to affect. 
It is a moot point, however, given its universalising tendencies, whether a return to Bourdieu’s 
notion of social capital is sufficient to allow for its application in a way that is sufficiently 
contextually sensitive, Fine (2010a). For, in what follows, we demonstrate that far from social 
capital being appropriately tempered by factoring in the presence of power and violence, it is 
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the latter that have been fundamental to the very nature of “social capital” in the Colombian 
context. We offer an account of how violence has been organised in Colombia, in conjunction 
with both civil society (social capital) and the state, to forge both a model and a mythology of 
development whilst waging a phony war on drugs and drug dealers who have been 
incorporated into, and/or deployed by, elites in their genuine wars to dispossess rural citizens.  
… To the Political Economy of Violence 
There have been three structural peaks of violence and human rights violations in Colombian 
history: the violence (1946 - 1965), the war against Pablo Escobar (1982–1993), and the 
narco-paramilitary violence (1991-2008). The last and most violent peak was due to a 
thoughtful strategy of deepening the neoliberal Development Model in Colombia.  
This was possible thanks to momentary agreements and teamwork between the ruling coalition 
and drug dealers. The two main drug cartels of Colombia, Medellin Cartel and Cali Cartel, 
were restructured after the killing of Pablo Escobar and the incarceration of the Orejuela 
brothers. Former members of drug cartels, such as Carlos Castaño Gil and “Don Berna”, 
founded a national narco-paramilitary project working as a team with members of the US 
Government, national economic elites, and the state, in order to grab land, expand business, 
and consolidate the strongest neoliberal development model in South America. 
The social capital of warfare 
For almost twenty years Colombia experienced the expansion of narco-paramilitary armies 
grouped inside a single structure. They are called narco-paramilitary because they were 
irregular armies that “aimed to protect and expand the status quo” (as the military did), and 
because they were fuelled by various sources of funding, including drug-trafficking. Empirical 
evidence shows that the expansion of the narco-paramilitary army between 1993 and 2002 
would not have been possible without three forces: (1) the military aid and doctrine 
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propagated by the USA; (2) the strategic and monetary assistance from national economic 
elites; and (3) the legal, military and political support of the state.  
In the beginning, these three forces and drug dealers created military groups in rural areas 
named Self-Defence armies. The national project, otherwise named the United Self-Defence 
Armies of Colombia (AUC), grouped together all former Self-Defence armies. The foundation 
and conglomeration of these armies are a key feature of the military doctrine of “Low Intensity 
Conflict” (LIC) promulgated by the US government since Reagan’s administration. According 
to Klare and Kornbluh (1988), LIC implies the combination of two very different tools: one 
widely formal and legal such as military aid and diplomacy; and the other widely informal and 
illegal such as paramilitary forces which are also known as proinsurgency operations: 
The “LIC pie”, as Pentagon insiders call it, is largely divided between 
counterinsurgency and proinsurgency operations … in other words, LIC doctrine is 
meant to be applied in countries such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, the Philippines, 
Angola, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, where the United States is either trying to bolster 
a client government against a revolutionary upheaval or fostering a 
counterrevolutionary/insurgency against an unfriendly Third World regime (p. 19).  
Both Colombian and international literatures assert that US military aid fostered narco-
paramilitary expansion from the 1990s onwards regardless of whether corresponding armies 
were legal or not. Dube and Naidu (2014) measured the effects of US military aid and 
concluded that it undermined formal institutions and strengthened armed non-state actors (p. 
2): 
US military assistance leads to a differential increase in attacks by paramilitaries, but 
has no effect on guerrilla attacks. Aid also results in more paramilitary (but not 
guerrilla) homicides during election years, particularly in politically competitive 
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municipalities. The findings suggest that foreign military assistance may strengthen 
armed non-state actors, undermining domestic political institutions 
All heads of AUC projects have accepted that drug-trafficking was a fundamental source of 
funding. However, they were also funded by multinational corporations, local landowners, and 
national economic elites. The first “legal” monetary assistance in this respect mainly 
originated from big companies of the Antioquia state. A parking lot was raided in Medellin in 
1998 as part of a judicial investigation carried out by the Attorney General’s Office. The 
financial and logistical centre of the AUC had operated from this parking lot since 1994. The 
judicial process was stopped due to administrative and safety issues. However, a report made 
by an anonymous group of academic researchers of the Instituto Popular de Capacitación 
(IPC) in 2010 found systemic support for narco-paramilitaries from a wide variety of 
enterprises, many of them reputable banks and manufacturing, retail and public companies 
(Durán, 2015: 114):16 
There was a chain of cheque endorsements that ended in a group of 30 bank accounts in 
different cities of Colombia where the people who handled AUC finances in these zones 
lived. A sample of two months in 1998 found 7,359 cheques with a combined value of 
$6.9 million dollars17 ... This means that narco-paramilitaries received around $41.4 
million dollars annually just from legal companies, without adding incomes from illegal 
activities and support from entrepreneurs in the rural areas. 
                                                            
16 Among these companies, there are listed Antioqueña de Curtidos S.A., Casa de Cambio Intercambio 
S.A., Coltejer, Comfenalco, Conavi, Concasa, Empresas Varias de Medellin, Granahorrar, Gran 
Cadena de Almacenes Colombiana S.A. (Cadenalco), Industrias Cadi, Industrias Kioto Ltda, Leonisa 
S.A., Miro Seguridad Ltda, Servicentro Esso Las Vegas, Surtipollos y Cia S.A., and Transportes Botero 
Soto. 
17 This is the result of dividing COL$ 9,276,000,000 by the exchange rate COL$/$ in March of 1998, 
1,343.85. 
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Landowners and multinational corporations also assisted narco-paramilitary expansion inside 
each region. For instance, the first narco-paramilitary unit of the AUC was the Bloque 
Bananero. In the judicial process for Justice and Peace, its head mentioned a list of more than 
100 ranchers, 364 banana entrepreneurs, and 194 banana firms that funded narco-
paramilitaries armies in the Urabá region.18 According to IPC (2010), this paramilitary head 
also negotiated with the US banana company, Chiquita Brands International Inc., contributing 
three cents for every banana box exported between 1997 and 2002. 
However, the most important assistance from legal “institutions” was mainly strategic, and 
came from national economic elites and the state. In an autobiography entitled “My 
Confession”, the first head of narco-paramilitary armies, Carlos Castaño Gil, documented 
various meetings with “high class” persons from 1987 with the purpose of “guiding” the 
counter-insurgency war (Aranguren, 2001: 89). This group of prominent businessmen was 
dubbed “the Group of Six” (p. 89): 
After that, the Group of Six showed up. I am not a bandit thanks to those men … The 
Group of Six can be found in a large period of the national history as men at the highest 
levels of Colombian Society. The cream of society!19  
The state also played a major role in the consolidation of warfare as a tool for “Development” 
in Colombia. The National Government authorised the creation of “Associations for 
Communitarian Surveillance – CONVIVIR” in September 1994, based on article 42 of the Law 
356 of 1994. These “associations” became both a warfare instrument and a tool for the 
consolidation of the narco-paramilitary project. In an interview in 2015, former President of 
Colombia, Ernesto Samper Pizano (1994–1998) stated: 
                                                            
18 This judicial file was dated as March 21, 2012, by the Attorney General’s Office, to the Deputy 
Prosecutor Number 25. 
19 Original quotes in Spanish. Translated by the authors. 
SOAS Department of Economics Working Paper Series No 195 - 2016 
 
 
18 
CONVIVIR had a valid principle: that helpless citizens could have communication 
systems and small weapons in order to organise their own defence always in 
coordination with state armed forces. The problem was that in the period of President 
Uribe, when he was Governor, he used CONVIVIR as warfare instrument. Therefore 
CONVIVIR ended in paramilitary groups, groups with a punitive role that never was 
expected of them.20 
Indeed, the Government of Antioquia helped to create armed CONVIVIR in several states. Just 
in one of the states of the Urabá region 18 CONVIVIR were created between September 1995 
and October 1996 (Durán, 2015: 81). CONVIVIR were used as a tool of warfare, going far 
beyond casually organised groups deploying small weapons: 
It was found in the consulting committee of the Superintendence that between January 
and December of 1996 this entity approved CONVIVIR to buy 422 submachine guns, 
373 pistols 9 mm, 217 shotguns, 17 Mini Uzi machine guns, 70 rifles, 109 pistols, and 
41 restricted weapons, which can range from Galil rifles to machine guns M-60, rocket 
launchers, grenades, rockets and mortars (CINEP, 2007: 2) 
According to the dossiers of the General Attorney’s Office, the security cooperatives 
CONVIVIR were a determining factor in the narco-paramilitary expansion, especially in the 
states of Meta, Casanare, Boyacá, Antioquia, Vichada, and Córdoba. The last narco-
paramilitary head, Salvatore Mancuso, described in court how: 
Narco-paramilitary expansion wouldn’t have been possible without the assistance of the 
state … Castaño brothers [who were the top heads of narco-paramilitaries] decided to 
                                                            
20 The original interview was made in Spanish by one of the researchers of this paper. Translation made 
by the authors. 
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take care of the illegal part, while Mancuso founded legal cooperatives (Valencia, 
2007:15).21 
Dossiers of the Attorney General’s Office have allowed certain features to be established 
regarding the paramilitary expansion. Generally, narco-paramilitary incursions in new 
territories were: 
1. Carefully planned from narco-paramilitary headquarters. They organized their military 
incursions with information regarding geopolitics, strategic “development” projects, 
and intelligence about important persons who lived in the regions.  
2. Accompanied by acts of extreme terror and violence, including torture, 
dismemberment, sexual violence, and other human rights violations with the 
complicity of state armed forces. 
3. Made up of joint armed forces from several territories that travelled through long 
detours in order to meet the territorial objective without being bothered by any state 
official en route.  
By 1995 paramilitary armies had control over all the Urabá region in the three states of Chocó, 
Córdoba, and Antioquia. They also expanded to the centre of the country towards the state of 
Cundinamarca. 
The second great expansion was made in 1997 to the south of the country in the states of 
Bolívar, Caquetá, Casanare, Guaviare, Meta, and Sucre. In 1998 the narco-paramilitary 
consolidated its presence in the South where there was a historical presence of guerrillas’ 
armies in Putumayo and Tolima. This second expansion also conforms to another strategic 
reorganisation. The First National Conference of leaders and commanders of Self-Defence 
                                                            
21 The Castaño brothers were the founders of the narco-paramilitary armies; Mancuso became in short 
time one of the most important heads of this group, and took the mandate after the Castaño brothers 
were killed. 
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Armies was called on April 18, 1997. At it, the Castaño brothers, who were commanders of 
the Self-Defence Armies of Cordoba and Urabá (ACCU), led a proposal to join forces with 
other narco-paramilitary groups in order to fund the AUC as a national project. (AUC, 1997) 
Finally, in 2001, such armies arrived in Arauca (to the east) and Atlántico (to the west). See 
Graph 1. 
Graph 1 NARCO-PARAMILITARY PRESENCE IN COLOMBIA BY STATES 
1991   1994   1997   2002 
   
Source: Authors based on the files of the Judicial Process for Justice and Peace of the 
Attorney General’s Office 
By 2000, the UN had characterised the assistance of the state in creating, developing and 
strengthened narco-paramilitary armies as an instrument of warfare all over the country: 
There are various paramilitary groups, organised under an umbrella group known as 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Paramilitary activity has grown significantly 
in recent years. Though no longer enjoying legal authority, as was the case from 1968 to 
1989, paramilitary structures effectively were institutionalised during the previous 
administration through the existence of ‘special private security and vigilance services’ 
(previously known as Convivir) legally authorised to carry arms and perform functions 
of public order similar to those of the armed forces and police. These armed groups 
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often have operated without effective control or adequate supervision on the part of 
authorities and, as OHCHR reports, their activities are difficult to distinguish from those 
of the militaries as ‘in many cases there are areas in which they coincide, converge or 
supplement or replace each other’. (Economic and Social Council of the UN, 2000: 6) 
Violence and monopolisation of natural resources 
Expansion of narco-paramilitary mainly accounts for the explosion of several types of 
violence and human rights violations. This is true both temporally and geographically within 
Colombia (See Graph 2). Exponential growth of “victims of the conflict” corresponds exactly 
with the golden years of paramilitary expansion. “Victims of the conflict” had an annual 
growth of 99.8% between 1993 and 2002, more than three times the annual growth of the 
“victims of the war on drugs” between 1985 and 1992. Moreover, the level of human rights 
violations in the same regions remained high in the process of consolidation between 2002 and 
2010. The numbers dropped dramatically only after the extradition of paramilitary heads to the 
USA in 2008 (See Graph 3). 
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Graph 2 PARAMILITARY PRESENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY 
TYPE AND STATE: 1994, 1997 AND 2002 
PARAMILITARY DISPLACED   TORTURES  MURDERS 
PRESENCE  PERSONS 
1994: 
    
1997: 
    
2002 
    
RANGES: 
    
Source: Authors based on data from the files of the Judicial Process for Justice and Peace of 
the Attorney General’s Office for the Paramilitary expansion, and Data from the National 
Registry of Victims for Human Rights Violations. 
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Graph 3 VICTIMS OF THE “CONFLICT” IN ALL THE TYPES OF CRIMES BY 
YEAR: FROM BEFORE 1985 TO 2010
 
Source: Authors based on National Registry of Victims, June 2015. 
Thus, the rise in the number of victims has been tightly related with the rise of narco-
paramilitaries armies. According to the Minister of Defence (quoted by the Observatory of 
Human Rights of the Vice-Presidency of the Republic, 2000:2), in 1986 there were 93 narco-
paramilitaries groups in Colombia. By 1990 these groups had grown to 1,150. Between 1993 
and 1999 paramilitary groups continued growing from 2,150 to 8,150. This expansion of 
paramilitary groups is closely correlated with the expansion in the number of victims, of more 
than 94% between 1986 and 1999. (See Graph 4). 
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Graph 4 NUMBER OF NARCO-PARAMILITARY GROUPS AND NUMBER OF VICTIMS 
BETEEEN: 1993 - 1999 (LEFT), SCATTER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICTIMS AND 
PARAMILITARY GROUPS: 1986 - 1999 (RIGHT)  
  
Source: Authors based on the Observatory of Human Rights of the Vice-Presidency of the 
Republic (2010) for the data about number of narco-paramilitary groups. Data about number 
of victims are from the National Registry of Victims (2015).  
National Government and mainstream media have argued that violence against civilians has 
been perpetrated mainly by guerrillas. However, according to the Group for Historical 
Memory, all kinds of human rights violations have been mainly perpetrated by narco-
paramilitaries, except in ‘Forced Disappearances’ where the main perpetrator was the state’s 
armed forces (See Graph 5). 
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Graph 5 VICTIMS BY TYPE OF VIOLENCE AND BY PERPETRATOR IN 
COLOMBIA 
 
*Data between 1980 and 2012 
** Data between 1997 and 2013 
Source: Group for Historical Memory (GMH) 
 
Despite narratives fostered by the mainstream media regarding the counterinsurgency 
attributes of narco-paramilitary actions, guerrillas were rarely targeted by paramilitaries. 
Rather, victims were mainly civilians, rural farmers who were living in areas for “further 
development”, which means their land for prospective economic projects. Indeed, the Group 
for Historic Memory (2012) has counted around 220,000 persons who were killed in armed 
actions in Colombia between 1958 and 2002, with more than 81% of them being civilians. 
This is 4.41 civilians killed for every member of the armies in the conflict.  
Perpetration of human rights violations committed against civilians was neither random nor 
accidental. Instead, it followed a logic according to strategic goals in each region, and its 
“geopolitical” situation. According to the Dossiers of the Attorney General’s Office, in almost 
all cases, narco-paramilitary armies not only had intelligence regarding social and political 
leaders, but also they had geopolitical, strategic and economic information . This information 
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was gathered thanks to the assistance of illegal forces (such as former paramilitaries), and 
legal bodies such as governments, military, and intelligence agencies. State assistance went far 
beyond military support.  
This explains why the type, number, and incidence of human rights violations varied widely 
across Colombia. However, as one of the main strategic objectives was the appropriation of 
land and natural resources, such violations were instrumental in fostering large numbers of 
forced displacements. According to the Unit of Victims, these accounted for 79.8% of all the 
acts committed in the “conflict” up to June of 2015 (6.8 million of acts of displacement out of 
8.6 million) (See Graph 6); and 86% of all acts in the period of study between 1990 and 2010. 
Graph 6 ACTS AGAINST CIVILIANS BY TYPE OF CRIME: FROM BEFORE 1985 
TO 2015 
 
Source: Authors based on National Registry of Victims, June 2015 
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Once paramilitaries had proven their territorial control over any institutional authority (or 
relying on the assistance of such authority), and had demonstrated their capacity to infringe 
extreme violence against civilians, it became easier to foster massive displacements and to 
monopolise the seizure of land without necessarily recourse to further acts of violence. For 
instance, it became common among researchers and public officials to hear that paramilitaries 
threatened their victims in forcing them to sell their land at a very cheap prices with the 
common refrain: “if you don’t sell the land today, I will buy it from your widow tomorrow” 
(El Espectador, 2010). 
This explains why massive forced displacements generally came after other human rights 
violations were committed. This also explains why displacements were not necessarily 
accompanied by other types of human rights violations at the same time.  
Economic interests underpinning human rights violations were also highlighted by the UN: 
Economic interest underlying the violence and conflict also are factors inducing 
displacement. As part of a process of so-called “counter-agrarian reform” (which at the 
time of the Representative’s first mission in 1994 had resulted in an estimated 3 per cent 
of the landowners controlling more than 70 percent of the arable land in the country), 
displacement is often a tool for acquiring land for the benefit of large landowners, 
narco-traffickers, as well as private enterprises planning large-scale projects for the 
exploitation of Natural resources … OHCHR reports having received testimony from a 
number of small and medium-scale farmers who have been robbed of their land by 
paramilitaries in the service of drug traffickers or local landowners, or who have had to 
sell their land cheaply before leaving the region under death treats (Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations, 2000: 7) 
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The same Report underlines both the focus on poor peasants as the main victims and 
displacements and land grabbing as the main goal:  
Displacement in Colombia is not merely incidental to the armed conflict but is also a 
deliberate strategy of war. Indeed rarely is there direct confrontation among armed 
groups (that is, the paramilitaries, guerrilla groups, and the armed forces/police). Rather, 
these armed groups attempt to settle their scores by attacking civilians suspected of 
being associated with the “other” side, and they do so with such severity as to leave 
those whose physical security is threatened with no choice but to flee. (Economic and 
Social Council of the United Nations, 2000: 2) 
As a result, and despite the official narrative as an “exemplary democracy”, Colombia has 
three times more disappeared persons than the three military dictatorships of South America 
combined: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (López, 2010:78). The largest number of human rights 
violations is through forced displaced persons. According to the internal displacement 
monitoring centre (IDMC, 2014), Colombia is the country with the second most numbers of 
displaced persons in the world after Syria (with at least 6.5 million displaced persons), 
followed by the Democratic Republic of Congo (with 2.96 million of internally displaced 
persons). 
The label of “conflict and violence” as the main driver of displacement is problematic. In 
Colombia it has been closely attached to legal and illegal economic projects. Violence and 
human rights violation have also been the mode of a specific development model that fosters 
internal displacement as a tool for relocating land and natural resources into the hands of drug 
dealers, retired army officers, multinational corporations and big business. In short, violence in 
Colombia is used as an instrument of neoliberal “Development”. 
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The consolidation of a successful neoliberal Development Model from 2002 
At the end of the 1980s, the ruling coalition in Colombia was threatened by guerrillas and drug 
dealers. On the one hand, the guerrillas’ strategy from the early eighties implied targeting 
landowners, and members of the state and national economic elites, in order to extort 
sufficient funding to grow militarily. On the other hand, a section of the drug dealers, known 
as “the extraditable persons”, were similarly kidnapping high class people in order to access 
funding and to negotiate a peace agreement with the state (Durán, 2015: 66-73). 
By 1992, a section of the drug dealers named PEPES (persecuted by Pablo Escobar), a special 
military unit known as the search block, and US military and Special Forces joined forces to 
kill extraditable persons and their head, Pablo Escobar Gaviria. This was the first time that 
joint work between drug dealers and members of the legal forces from Colombia and the USA 
became publicly visible. The research journalist Mark Bowden described in 2001 how: 
I came across the DEA’s cable traffic back and forth from Bogotá to Washington which 
documents the knowledge of DEA agents that LOS PEPES were intimately involve with 
the [state military force] The Search Block. Ambassador Busby himself wrote a cable to 
Washington where he details the fact that their own intelligence showed that there was a 
connection between LOS PEPES and the Search Block. In fact, the ambassador Busby 
have gone to president Gaviria to complain about this and to demand that these 
connections ceased and desisted … officially the United States was not involved in the 
efforts of LOS PEPES, but if you look at what they were doing in Colombia at the time, 
it was clear that they were working hand in hand with LOS PEPES whether they were 
intending it or not. 
Carlos Castaño Gil, who was the head of PEPES and former Pablo Escobar associate, also 
commented in the same documentary: 
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There was a strategy, wide, perfect, outlined by the United States, by these agencies, in 
which each one did what each one had to do. 
By 1995, the mainstream media had sold the narrative of the triumph of the state over drug 
cartels, rendering themselves invisible to critical public opinion by pinpointing guerrillas as 
Colombia’s main problem. The narrative began to be spread of narco-paramilitaries as 
counterinsurgent armies founded by legal landowners in defence of themselves and the 
country itself against the communist peril.  
Between 1991 and 2002, narco-paramilitaries and their AUC national project had spread from 
two to 22 of the 32 states of Colombia. In 2002, the same person, Álvaro Uribe, that had 
pushed CONVIVIR forward as a warfare tool for paramilitaries when he was Governor of 
Antioquia between 1995 and 1997 became President of Colombia between 2002 and 2010 
with the assistance of the ruling coalition and the mainstream media. 
The consolidation of this process between 2002 and 2010 included spreading violence over the 
country to monopolise land and natural resources, and strengthening the narco-state without 
historical precedent in working for the ruling coalition, not least in bolstering investment and 
economic growth in those sectors that drew on extension of land use. 
The process of consolidation of drug cartels into paramilitary armies and its damage in terms 
of violence and deinstitutionalisation have been observed by former politicians and former 
drug dealers on several occasions. For instance, former Colombian President Andres Pastrana 
(1998-2002) stated in 2013: 
If we had done a deep investigation regarding Medellin cartel, Cali cartel, and all the 
other cartels, today we wouldn’t have the Medellin cartel in its mutation to paramilitary 
armies, which may be what is doing the most harm today to the Colombian people 
(Pastrana, 2013. In Documentary: Pablo Escobar’s times). 
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In the same direction, a former member of the Medellin drug cartel, aka “Popeye”, stated in 
the same documentary: 
When Pablo Escobar died everyone was happy and everyone was saying that violence 
and drug-trafficking was over. Rather, that was the point when it really began. 
‘Paramilitaries’ have never existed. They are only drug-trafficking groups with a flag 
and a hymn. They took over Colombia and brought coca plantations to Colombia 
because we didn’t have coca plantations in Colombia… Colombia became producer of 
coca paste under paramilitaries. (Velásquez, 2013. In Documentary: Pablo Escobar 
times) 
With the expansion of narco-paramilitaries and their AUC national project, drug dealers began 
to gain unprecedentedly powerful positions within the narco-state. One of the expressions of 
the growing insertion of drug dealers into the state has been the assistance for elected 
politicians. According to López, et al (2010: 31), by 1994, the judicial process which 
investigated links between politicians and the Cali drug cartel, showed that Congressmen 
found guilty accounted for 900,000 votes, and illicit money was a “determinant” in the 
election of the President. For the elections of 2002 and 2006, the judicial process “Justice and 
Peace” showed that voting fostered by narco-paramilitaries had grown to more than two 
million votes, and 80% of the Congressmen so elected were part of the president’s coalition 
(See Graph 7). 
Indeed, narco-paramilitary head, Salvatore Mancuso, stated after the elections for President 
and Congress in 2002: 
We “recommended” candidates to the people … according to the data we have, we can 
state that the goal of having 35% of the Congressmen among our friends has been 
largely achieved. This constitutes a milestone in AUC history … This support exceeds 
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our most optimistic projections. (Mancuso, 2002; quoted by López and Sevillano, 2007: 
1) 
Graph 7 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE VOTING FOR CONGRESSMEN ELECTED 
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF DRUG-DEALERS IN 1994 AND IN 2002, 2006 
 
Source: Authors based on López (2010) 
Three years later, paramilitary head Carlos Castaño Gil confirmed: 
I think we can say that we have more than 35% among our friends in Congress. We will 
improve this next elections. (Castaño, 2005; quoted by López and Sevillano, 2007: 2). 
According to López et al (2010: 29), by April of 2010, the Attorney General’s Office of 
Colombia was reported to be prosecuting 400 elected politicians because of their connections 
to narco-paramilitaries; 102 were members of Congress. It was also prosecuting 109 public 
officials, 324 members of the National Army, and 5,766 citizens involved in criminal activities 
with narco-paramilitaries. 
Heads of narco-paramilitaries armies used signed agreements in order to avoid the so-called 
principal-agent problem. These signed agreements have been disclosed by paramilitaries in 
judicial processes. Some of the most famous agreements are: the “Ralito Agreement”, signed 
in the State of Cordoba for Congress elections of 2002; the agreements of “Chivolo and 
Pivijai”, signed in the State of Magdalena; the agreement for an “Urabá great and united” 
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signed in the State of Antioquia; and many others signed in States such as Casanare, Caldas, 
and Risaralda, (López, 2010, and Valencia, 2012) 
In research regarding “the scandal of parapolitics”, López concluded: 
The evidence found in judicial processes goes far beyond the most reckless hypotheses 
about the magnitude and implications of linkages between politicians, public officials, 
and criminal organisations, about the joint and deliberate actions that were deployed in 
order to meet economic and political goals, and about its effects on the political and 
institutional transformation in some states of the country. (López, et al 2010: 31) 
Accordingly, criminals co-governed with the ruling coalition between 2002 and 2010 in both 
the National Congress and the Presidency of Colombia. Congressmen worked as a team for the 
economic and political interests of paramilitaries and business elites. These interests were 
largely represented and supported by the National Government throughout this period. As 
Paredes et al (2003) and Borrero et al (2004) have found, these interests involved rural land 
expropriation, economic policies to enhance certain economic sectors, privatisation of state 
enterprises, enhancing money laundering, regressive tax reforms, restraining of labour and 
social rights, and deepening of the health and pension private model. 
For instance, “the prescription to acquisition” was used in order to legalise acquisition of 
denuded lands. According to the Civil Code, a person can acquire a vacant land after a certain 
time, once complying with other legal requirements. Given the great amount of land left 
vacant due to threats from narco-paramilitaries armies, the prescription to acquisition became 
a way to acquire these lands legally. Law 791 of 2002 reduced the time necessary before 
appropriation to five years for land and three years for movable property. As seen before, the 
largest share of displacements was made during the 1990s, ably abetted by a law for usurping 
these possessions (Peña, Parada and Zuleta, 2012: 137) 
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Even when a large share of Congressmen was prosecuted for their links with narco-
paramilitaries, the National Government tried to bind them institutionally to the wide range of 
national reforms that suited the interests of national and international economic elites. In 2006, 
the former President of Colombia publicly stated:  
I'll ask all Congressmen who have supported us: before going to in jail, go and vote for 
the transferences reform, the capitalisation of the state oil company, and the tax reform. 
The ruse that I cannot ask for their vote because it is immoral, so the opposition defeat 
us to not approving this legislative agenda ... No way! We are warriors! (Uribe, 2006) 
Judicial processes have demonstrated the teamwork involved between the Presidency and 
narco-paramilitaries between 2002 and 2010. These processes included more than twenty high 
level governmental officials prosecuted for their relationships with drug-dealers, illegal 
armies, or both (La Silla Vacía, 2010), the use of governmental agencies directly to commit 
crimes against humanity (El Espectador, 2009 and El Nuevo Herald, 2010) and to export 
illegal drugs (García, 2009), and meetings between high level members of the National 
Government and narco-paramilitaries to wiretap members of the Supreme Court (La Silla 
Vacía, 2012). These criminal actions have been fully known to the US Government without 
any consequences in light of its strong relationship with the former Colombian President 
during the Bush and Obama administrations. Rather, the US Government has continuously 
supported the former Colombian President in his active political role to the present time 
(Colombia Reports, 2015). Disclosed emails of the former US Secretary of State, Hillary 
Clinton, have shown the characteristic USA double standards in its foreign policy: 
On June 3, 2010, Clinton’s Chief of Staff, Cheryl Mills, forwarded her an email from 
the former US ambassador William Brownfield. In this email Brownfield suggests that 
Hillary Clinton should remind President Uribe the necessity for an independent 
investigation into some key issues such as the extrajudicial executions committed by 
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members of the Colombian Army on peasants, the corruption of the National Security 
Agency (DAS), and the scandal of parapolitics that included allies, governmental 
officials, and a relative of President Uribe ...” (Coronell, 2015: 1) 
Narco-paramilitary influence on voting grew steadily in the stage of narco-paramilitary 
expansion until 2002. In the stage of consolidation of the Development Model (2002–2010), 
this feature persisted despite the demobilisation of AUC between 2005 and 2008, and the fall 
in human rights violations from 2002. This phenomenon is known as “persuasion power”. 
After demonstrating their territorial control and their capacity for harming the population in 
the stage of narco-paramilitary expansion, AUC continued to gain votes. (See Graph 8 and 
Graph 9). Persuasion power beyond 2008, when completely demobilised, is explained by the 
so called “criminal gangs” that substituted for the AUC. Heads of the criminal gangs belonged 
to the same AUC structures as before, working for big businesses and landowners in the 
regions, although they were not coordinated through national command. 
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Graph 8 NARCO-PARAMILITARY VOTING BETWEEN 1998 AND 20010 IN 
COLOMBIA* 
1998    2002    2006 
 
 2010     RANGES 
   
Source: Authors based on Judicial Processes and the National Registry of the Civil State. 
* Narco-paramilitary votes were calculated following these steps. First, Congressmen, Mayors, 
and Governors who have been already found guilty for their linkages with paramilitaries were 
identified according to the files of Judicial Process for Justice and Peace. Second, number of 
votes by city and state of each of these politicians were counted according to the National 
Registry for the Civil State in Colombia. 
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Graph 9 NARCO-VOTING (RIGHT), AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (LEFT) 
IN COLOMBIA: 1998 – 2010
 
Source: Authors based on National Registry of National State and National Unit of Victims 
 
Exponential growth of displacements and monopolisation of land between 1993 and 2002, the 
tendency of human rights violations over the whole period of study, and the persistence of 
persuasion power in the stage of consolidation of the development model between 2002 and 
2010, explain both the changes in landed property and the growth in certain economic sectors. 
According to Ibáñez and Muñoz (2011), around 3.6 million farmers were displaced by illegal 
armed groups between 2000 and 2010 in order to profit from natural resources, to appropriate 
land, and to secure roads for drug-trafficking. More than 78% of displaced persons were the 
consequence of economic activities between 2000 and 2010. In an interview in 2015 Ibáñez 
stated: 
What we found was that land inequality was already high in 2000. What happened was 
that it got worse between 2000 and 2010 (Ibañez, 2015, quoted by Durán, 2015: 103) 
Indeed, authors estimate that inequality on landed property grew between 2000 and 2010. In 
2000, 13.6% of the richest people owned 75.7% of the land. By 2010, it had risen to 77.6%. 
Isolated regions projected for natural resource exploitation were more concentrated, 
supporting remarks made by former Colombian President Ernesto Samper in an interview: 
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There was an agrarian counter-reform in the last 20 years in Colombia. In just ten years 
7 million of hectares were monopolised by paramilitaries, big landowners, and 
ranchers. This equals 2.5 times what we had gain in the agrarian reform over the 
former 50 years. It was an agrarian counter-reform that totally changed power 
structures inside Colombia. So, there it is a fair clear alliance of interests: Favouring 
specific armed groups to protect economic interests (Samper, 2015; quoted by Durán, 
2015: 103) 
These specific economic interests are transparent in sectors such as banana, palm oil, and 
energy and mining. Together these sectors accounted for around 70% of total exports in 2009 
(See Graph 10). These sectors are difficult to develop for three main reasons: (1) extensive 
amounts of lands are needed to accrue economies of scale, (2) great amounts of initial 
investment are needed with more than a decade before returns begin, and (3) high levels of 
public intervention are important to ensure legal certainty and public support for long-term 
plans. All these problems were overcome thanks to corresponding support from the National 
Government, laws and regulations proposed in the National Congress that provided 
differential treatment for potential investors, aggressive funding plans developed by the 
Minister of Agriculture in joint work with the financial sector, the availability of extensive 
lands at low prices given the described counter-agrarian reform with the assistance of narco-
paramilitaries and, finally, the willingness to invest by wealthy entrepreneurs and drug dealers. 
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Graph 10 GRAPHICAL DEPICTION OF COLOMBIA’S PRODUCT EXPORTS IN 28 
COLOUR-CODED CATEGORIES, 2009 
 
Source: MIT/Harvard Atlas for Economic Complexity. (Haussmann and Hidalgo et al, 2009) 
Banana exports mainly derive from the Urabá region where the AUC project was founded 
before spreading all over the country. The number of states producing palm oil and hectares 
sown began to grow exponentially in the stage of consolidation from 2002. In 1990, palm oil 
was sown in only nine states. The number was steady until 2002. By 2010, the number had 
almost doubled to nineteen. (See Graph 11). Land used for palm oil tripled from 1990 to 2010, 
and from 89,671 to 284,582 hectares. 
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Graph 11 NUMBER OF STATES WITH PALM OIL IN COLOMBIA: 1990 – 2010 
 
Source: Minister of Agriculture. (AGRONET) 
Expansion of hectares sown on palm oil followed the same tendency of displacements during 
the narco-paramilitary expansion (1993–2002). However, hectares of palm oil continued to 
grow exponentially in the stage of consolidation between 2002 and 2010, just after the peak of 
displacements, land grabbing, and the consolidation of the narco-state which corresponds to 
the peak of persuasion power. See Graph 12. 
Mining is similar. According to Rudas (2011), between 1990 and 2002, the National 
Government issued mining titles on 1.05 million hectares, an average of 323,072 hectares for 
each presidential period. Then, in the next two presidential periods (2002–2010) the 
government issued mining titles on 7.4 million hectares, an average of 3.7 million of hectares 
in each presidential period (an increase of more than eleven times). 
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Graph 12 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HECTARES SOWN OF PALM OIL* AND 
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN COLOMBIA: 1990 - 2010 
 
Source: Minister of Agriculture (AGRONET)* and National Unit of Victims 
 
Accordingly, mining and energy exports began to grow exponentially in the stage of 
consolidation, just after narco-paramilitaries armies reached their peak of territorial control 
and displacements in 2002 (See Graph 13). 
 
Graph 13 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MINING AND ENERGY EXPORTS (IN 
TONS) AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN COLOMBIA: 1990 - 2010 
 
Source: Authors based on UPM (2011: 23) and NRV (2015). 
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Durán (2015) applied three statistical tools to test the spatial and temporal relationship 
between human rights violations and the growth of palm oil and mining. He concludes that: 
[As in the case of Palm Oil], human right violations acted as a magnet of mining 
growth, therefore, Human Rights violations were instrumental for “Development” from 
the mainstream economics viewpoint. (Durán, 2015: 128). 
Moreover, human rights violations allow a spiral of growth and economic “development” that 
would have been impossible otherwise. The author found specific sources of added economic 
value created by human rights violations. These are: (1) falling production costs, (2) money 
laundering, and (3) relocation compensation. (Graph 14). 
 
Graph 14 SOURCES OF ADDED ECONOMIC VALUE CREATED BY HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
Source: Authors 
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laundering also creates economic value in land selling, land purchasing, and fictitious exports. 
Finally, relocation compensation also creates economic value in the money to be made out of 
dams, roads, and other infrastructure projects. (Durán 2015: 104-110)  
The optimization of the economic value given human rights violations has followed a method 
of two operational steps: (1) paramilitaries made evictions, and (2) property of the 
monopolised land is passed to legal firms, real or fictitious, in order to perform real or 
fictitious economic activities. This method allows formal firms to avoid paying any 
compensation under the legal excuse of the existence of an “armed conflict”. Therefore, 
displaced persons have no rights to compensation by those companies that use the land for 
economic purposes. 
Displaced persons become “displaced from the violence” and find themselves in public 
programmes funded by the state under special regulations. These are laid down by the 
Constitutional Court, especially in rulings T-327 and T-025 of 2004. This means that all 
processes and compensation costs are funded by the state. This also means that all the rights 
deriving from International Law are legally overlooked by the state through appealing to the 
excuse of the “armed conflict”. 
Conclusions 
 
There is an occasional inclination in the social capital literature to accept that it can have a 
dark, negative or perverse side, with organised crime and drugs a favoured example. Such 
observations tend to be readily set aside and a focus placed upon the positive potential of 
social capital, if leaving behind an increasingly distant acknowledgement that social capital 
can be used for bad as well as for good. Such a dichotomy can, however, be perceived to go to 
the heart of the conceptual inadequacies of social capital as a universalising concept with 
(unavoidable) deficits (its implicit perception of other “capital” as non-social) as well as 
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contingent ones (how it has evolved away, for example, from Bourdieu to World Bank 
conceptualisations). For, once power, class, conflict and context are explicitly brought to bear 
upon the social capital paradigm, it becomes immediate that social capital is always good and 
bad at one and the same time, reflecting oppression as well as cooperation, support or 
resistance to the social order.  
In this light, our case study of Colombia cannot be legitimately accepted as such and simply 
pigeonholed as an extreme example of bad social capital. Rather, the oldest democracy in 
Latin America has been captured by national elites, drug dealers and multinational firms, ably 
abetted by the US government, and has launched a campaign of systematic violence against its 
citizenry under the paper-thin ideology of development and the war against drugs and 
terrorism. Accordingly, social capital is riddled through with determinants it does not care to, 
and cannot, recognise. That this is so obvious to those who care to see in case of Colombia 
renders it no less the case where social capital more surreptitiously seeks to promote more 
favourable outcomes within unexamined, and so analytically uncontested, structures of power, 
control and oppression. 
Despite the mainstream definition of social capital shaped by the World Bank, a 
comprehensive approach in studying social capital within a country has to account for the 
relationship between the social structures (including class, the state and its coalitions) and the 
results in terms of capital (including its distribution and accumulation over time). This 
approach has been applied in this paper as a standpoint of what could be defined as “real social 
capital”. 
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